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The first federal price discrimination law was adopted in 1914
as section 2 of the Clayton Act.' That law was designed to deal with
price discrimination by a seller that might have an adverse effect
on competition with other sellers. The problem the law intended
to solve was the probably anti-competitive effects stemming from
the practice of a company,.particularly a large national enterprise,
selling at one price in an area where it had little or no competi-
tion, and at a lower price m an area where competition was stronger.
The expected effect of this discrimination was to weaken or destroy
competition, particularly by local sellers, in the latter area.
Subsequent to the adoption of section 2 in 1914, and especially
in the 1930's, the focus of legislative attention shifted from the ef-
fects of discriminatory selling practices on other sellers to the adverse
competitive effect on buyers stemming from large buyers, particu-
larly chain stores, inducing and receiving lower prices than their
competitors, thereby enabling the large buyers to resell at a lower
price. An extensive investigation. of chain store buying practices
was conducted by the FTC in the 1930's.2
Several different practices were deemed inimicable to competi-
tion. One was the practice of large buyers inducing and receiving,
and sellers granting, lower prices than those charged to smaller
buyers. Another was the practice of sellers using brokers to sell their
goods. A seller with goods having a unit price oE one hundred might
use brokers who worked for a commission of five percent. On sales
of one hundred units to twenty different buyers, each broker would
receive a commission of five percent on the sale of each unit. The
price per unit to each customer was one hundred, and the seller's
net recovery was ninety-five. A large buyer, who purchased a total of
several hundred units at one time, was often able to persuade the
*Based on a speech presented at the annual meeting of the Ohio State Bar As.
socation, Dayton, Ohio, May 12, 1967. It is intended to provide a general revlcw of
the subjects discussed. More detailed treatment may be found in Rows, PRIcZ Dis.
URIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT (1962) and 1964 Supplemcnt, and
C.C.H. TRADE REG. REP. (1968).
tLL.B. Harvard University; member of the firm of Thompson, Hine & Flory,
Cleveland, Ohio.
i Ch. 323, 38 STAT. 730 (1914)
2 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION [hereinafter FTC], FINAL REPORT ON TIlE CHAIN
STORE INVESTIGATION, S. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935).
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seller not to use brokers in selling to him, on the ground that
brokers were unnecessary, and to pass along the unpaid commission
to the buyer, with the result that the large buyer paid ninety-five
per unit, while the smaller buyers each paid one hundred. Another
practice was that of the seller providing promotional assistance to
some, but not all, of his customers in the form of allowances, e.g.,
providing demonstrators for his merchandise at a buyer's place of
business, or underwriting all or part of the cost of a buyer's advertis-
ing of his product.
The Robinson-Patman Act,3 adopted in 1936, was intended to
deal with the problems of the small buyer created by these practices.
Section 1 of the Act amended section 2 of the Clayton Act and broke
that section down into six subsections, (a) through (f). Section
2 (a) of the Clayton Act, as amended, makes it unlawful for a seller
to discriminate in the price of goods that he sells, where certain
adverse effects on competition may result. It also makes provision
for the cost justification defense and the changing conditions defense.
Section 2 (b) deals with the burden of proof, and more importantly,
provides for the good faith meeting of competition defense. Sec-
tion 2 (c) deals with brokerage, and in very general terms, makes
it unlawful for a seller to make payments or allowances as, or in
lieu of, brokerage to the buyer in connection with the sale of goods.
Sections 2 (d) and (e) make it unlawful for a seller to pay promo-
tional allowances, or to provide promotional services and facilities
to a buyer in connection with the buyer's processing, handling, sale
or offer of the seller's merchandise, unless such allowances, services
or facilities are available on proportionately equal terms to all other
buyers competing with the favored buyer. Section 2 (f) makes it un-
lawful for a buyer knowingly to induce or receive a prohibited price
discrimination.
Three points regarding the scope of section 2 are noteworthy.
First, in a price discrimination proceeding, under section 2 (a)
against the seller or under section 2 (f) against a buyer, it is neces-
sary that the proponent establish not merely the fact of the discrim-
ination in price, but also the probably adverse effect on competition.
But in a proceeding involving brokerage under section 2 (c) or pro-
motional payments, allowances or services under sections 2 (d) and
(e), no showing of probably adverse competitive effect is required.
The reason generally ascribed for this difference is that brokerage
and promotional allowances are secret or underhanded forms of dis-
crimination, and are absolutely prohibited in order to force them
3 15 U.S.C. §§ I, 13a, 13b, 21a (1964).
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into the open in the form of price discrimination.4
Second, the Act imposes liability on both the seller and the
buyer in connection with price discrimination and brokerage. Sec-
tions 2 (d) and (e), the promotional allowances sections, impose
liability only on the seller, not on the buyer. The FTC has decided,
however, and has also successfully established in several circuits,6
that the knowing inducement or receipt of unlawful promotional
allowances is a violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act,0 which makes "unfair methods of competition in com-
merce" subject to FTC cease and desist orders.
Third, section 2 of the Clayton Act provides only for civil rem-
edies, i.e., a cease and desist order by the FTC, an injunction in a
court proceeding brought by the Justice Department (which rarely
enforces the section), and the recovery of damages and/or an in-
junction by a private party. Section 2 contains no criminal penal-
ties.7
I. PRICE DISCRIMINATION
The following are required to establish a violation of section
2 (a): (1) Discrimination (2) in price (3) of commodities (4) of
like grade and quality (5) sold at or about the same time (6) by
one seller to two different purchasers (7) where at least one sale is
across a state line (8) where both sales are for use, consumption or
resale within the United States or territories under its jurisdiction
(9) and where the effect of the discrimination may be to injure,
destroy or prevent competition with the seller, the buyer, or a pur-
chaser from the buyer.
There are three statutory affirmative defenses: cost justification,
good faith meeting of competition, and changing conditions. One
of these-the good faith meeting of competition defense-will be dis-
cussed below.
A. Sales by One Seller to at Least Two Purchasers
This requirement has several aspects. There must be at
least two purchases." Refusals to sell are not covered,0 although a
4 RowE, Piucr DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT, 364-72 (19062).
5 The Grand Union Co., 57 F.T.C. 382, 416 (1960), modified on other grounds,
The Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962); Giant Food, Inc. v. FTC,
307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 910 (1963).
o 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1964).
7 Section 3 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1964), contains criminal penalties for
certain types of price discrimination and for selling at unreasonably low prices with
the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor. This section has
not played a significant part in the development of price discrimination law.
8 Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331, 333 (3rd Cir. 1939).
0 Becker v. Safelite Glass Corp., 244 F. Supp. 625, 636 (D. Kan. 1965).
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recent decision held that a binding contract of sale constituted a
"sale" for Robinson-Patman purposes.'0
Where a parent and a subsidiary, or two or more affiliated corp-
orations, separately sell the same product to two different purchasers
at different prices, the question arises whether the selling entities
constitute one seller, and hence fall under the Robinson-Patman Act,
or whether there are separate sales by companies that are unrelated
for Robinson-Patman purposes. Resolution of the issue turns on
whether the selling entities are under common operational control."
Where a company sells merchandise to a third party and also
transfers goods to its own subsidiary, branch or division, there is a
question whether the related transferee is a "purchaser" for Rob-
inson-Patman purposes. The issue is resolved in terms of control,
the question being whether the transferee is sufficiently independent
to be considered a purchaser in its own right' 2
Another problem arises where a company sells merchandise to
one class of trade, such as distributors, which in turn resells to
another class of trade such as retailers, and the company also sells
directly to the retailers through agents. There, the issue is whether
the agent is a purchaser, or merely part of the seller. In Loren Spe-
cialty Mfg. Co. v. Clark Mfg. Co.'3 the court found the agent was
not a purchaser where the agent never took title, orders went direct-
ly from the customer to the factory, billing was done by the factory,
and the factory assumed credit and transit risks.
Where the seller makes sales of merchandise directly to retailers,
and also sells to wholesalers who in turn resell to retailers, the issue
is whether the retailer buying through the wholesaler is an "indirect
purchaser" of the seller. This issue has been resolved in terms of
whether the seller deals directly with the indirect buying retailer,
and whether the seller determines the prices at which the whole-
saler resold to that retailer. When both these conditions exist, the
indirect purchasing retailer has been held to be a purchaser from
the seller.14
30 Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Tandet, 235 F. Supp. 111, 114 (D. Conn. 1964).
11 Bairn & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541, 543 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).
12 Reines Distributors, Inc. v. Admiral Corp., 257 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
granting motion for a separate trial, 256 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 196).
13 241 F. Supp. 493 (N.D.Ill. 1965), aff'd, 360 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1966) cert. denied,
385 U.S. 957 (1966).
14 American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
824 (1962).
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B. Like Grade and Quality
The Robinson-Patman Act applies only where the discrimina-
tion is practiced as to commodities of "like grade and quality". The
chief question in this area has been whether physically similar pri-
vate label merchandise and branded merchandise are commodities
of like grade and quality.
The issue has special significance because the FTC, in the meet-
ing competition area, has taken the position that the meeting com-
petition defense does not permit a seller to lower his prices of
branded goods to the level of a competitor's unbranded goods-the
rationale being that branded goods have greater consumer accept-
ance than unbranded goods, and hence that quoting the same price
for branded goods as for unbranded goods is beating, rather than
meeting, competition.,
On this theory, it would seem that physically identical branded
and unbranded goods are not goods of like grade and quality. But
in FTC v. Borden Co.'0 the Supreme Court held that physically
identical goods are goods of like grade and quality despite dif-
ferences in brand and in consumer acceptance. It limited its hold-
ing to the like grade and quality question, and expressly reserved
decision on the FTC's position on the meeting competition defense.
Thus physically identical goods are of like grade and quality despite
differences in brand and consumer acceptance. One problem left for
decision, however, is what differences must exist between products
so that they are not of like grade and quality.
Physically different but functionally similar goods may differ
in various respects, e.g., raw materials, manufacturing processes, size,
design, configuration and packaging, and the decided cases provide
no clear answer to the limits of the like grade and quality concept.
For example, the FTC's decision in the Joseph A. Kaplan1" case in-
dicates that differences in pattern and design alone are not enough,
in the Commission's view, to make goods of unlike grade and qual-
ity. At present, the most important cases are Universal-Rundle's
and Quaker Oats,'9 where the Commission held that goods having
substantial physical differences affecting consumer preferences were
15 See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 277, 296 (1957), a! J'd, FTC v. An-
heuser-Busch, Inc., 36& U.S. 536 (1960).
16 383 U.S. 637 (1966).
17 Joseph A. Kaplan & Son, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. [1963-1965 Transfer Binder]
16,666 (1963).
18 Universal-Rundle Corp., TRADE REG. REP. [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] 16,948
(1964).
19 Quaker Oats Co., TRADE REG. REP. [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] 17,134 (1964).
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not of like grade and quality.
The Universal-Rundle case involved bathtubs that were sold
to the trade under the Universal-Rundle label and to Sears, Roebuck
for private label resale. These products had similar raw materials,
different amounts of such materials, similar manufacturing opera-
tions, differences in height that affected price, differences in enam-
eled area, differences in the features built into the tubs, and differ-
ences in design. The Commission found that the differences in the
Universal-Rundle branded tub made that product more desirable
and hence more marketable than the private label product sold to
Sears, Roebuck.
The Quaker Oats case involved oat flour. The Commission
found that one blend was not of like grade and quality with another
blend, where the lower priced blend had a substantially higher hull
content than the other blends, required reprocessing by the pur-
chaser, and was generally unacceptable except to one customer.
C. Injury to Competition
Assuming there has been the requisite discrimination in price,20
it must be established that such discrimination may injure, destroy
or prevent competition with the seller or the favored buyer.
The law is well established in the secondary, or buyer's, line
cases that probable injury to competition may be inferred where a
substantial price differential is sustained over a significant period of
time in an industry where profit margins are low and competition
is keen. The Morton Salt2 case, decided by the Supreme Court in
1948, first established this principle, and the Commission and courts
have adhered to it since that time.2 2
The most common primary, or seller's, line case occurs where a
seller operating in more than one market has different prices in
those markets, the difference in prices usually reflecting the seller's
decision on how best to compete in a particular market. Primary
line cases present more difficult problems than secondary line cases,
because any restriction on the right of a seller to adjust his prices
downward in a particular market (where he quotes a single price
20 The Supreme Court has made clear that price discrimination means simply
price difference. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 US. 536 (1960).
21 FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
22 The law relating to injury to competition at the buyer's level has developed in
cases involving goods sold for resale. Where the discrimination involves goods sold
for inclusion in a manufactured article, or for use rather than resale, there is a ques-
tion whether the discrimination may cause an adverse effect on competition. See
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. FTC, 191 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1951). cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 206 (1952).
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to all customers) may conflict with the basic policy of encouraging
competition expressed in the Sherman Act.
A seller charging different prices in different markets discrim-
inates in price, and the question to be resolved is under what cir-
cumstances should the seller be found to have injured, destroyed or
prevented competition with another seller in the lower-priced mar-
ket. While it had long been thought that liability of the seller in this
situation depended upon predatory pricing conduct, as indicated
directly by expressions of intent and circumstantially by conduct
such as sales below cost; and that diversion of business from one
seller to another is a competitive fact of life, and is not sufficient to
violate the law in the absence of predatory conduct, the FTC's de-
cision in the Dean Milk28 case and the Supreme Court's decision in
the Utah Pie24 case cast substantial doubt on the validity of these
conclusions.
In the Dean Milk case, Dean Milk was found to have violated
the statute by injuring competition at the seller's level. The majority
opinion expressly rejected the predatory pricing test as the sole
basis of injury at the seller's level. Chairman Dixon stated:
It is the Commission's opinion that a finding of possible
substantial competitive injury on the seller level is warranted in
the absence of predation where the evidence shows significant
diversion of business from the discriminator's competitors to the
discriminator or diminishing profits to competitors resulting
either from the diversion of business or from the necessity of
meeting the discriminator's lower prices, provided that these im-
mediate actual effects portend either a financial crippling of
those competitors, a possibility of an anti-competitive concentra-
tion of business in large sellers, or a significant reduction in the
number of sellers in the market ....
[I]f a large national firm enters a new market with the intent of
merely securing a foothold in the market or of wrestling a share
of the market from another competitor, either smaller or larger,
but, in carrying out this legitimate purpose, utilizes a price dis-
crimination which actually lessens or which may lessen the abil-
ity of local firms to compete with it, the requisite statutory in-
jury has occurred.
In determining whether or not there is a reasonable possibility
that the ability of local firms to compete with the new entrant
will be lessened, factors such as ... the length of time the dis-
crimination is practiced, the severity of the price cut, and the re-
lationship between demand and price in the market, should be
23 Dean Milk Co., TRuD REG. REP. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] 1 17,357 (1965).
24 Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 US. 685 (1967), rehearing denied,
387 U.S. 949 (1967), noted in 29 OHio ST. L.J. 237 (1968).
[Vol. 29
PRICE DISCRIMINATION
considered.25
The Utah Pie case involved the pricing practices of three na-
tional frozen pie sellers in the Utah market. Between 1958 and 1961,
Pet Milk Co., Carnation Co. and Continental Baking Co. each sold
at lower prices in the Utah market than they sold elsewhere, and
the Supreme Court found evidence that each had sold below cost
or had engaged in the predatory practices. The plaintiff, Utah Pie
Co., filed a treble-damage action, and the jury returned a verdict
in plaintiff's favor. The facts indicated that Utah's share of the
frozen pie market in 1958 was sixty-six percent and that it held forty-
five percent at the time it filed its complaint in 1961. The facts
further showed that Utah had increased its net sales each year, and
that it had also shown profits in each year-it lost 6,000 dollars in
1957, and in the following four years had net income of 7,000,
12,000, 7,600 and 9,000 dollars. The court of appeals reversed the
district court, finding that Utah Pie had a near monopoly in 1958
and that its decline in the market position to forty-five percent re-
sulted from proper and healthy price competition.
The Supreme Court reversed in a 6-2 ruling. While the Supreme
Court pointed out the predation and below cost sales of the defend-
ants, the case goes further than prior law. The Court emphasized
that the general price structure in the Utah market had declined
drastically-from $4.90 per dozen in early 1958 to $2.85 per dozen
in 1961. A key sentence in the opinion reads as follows:
[The jury] could also have reasonably concluded that a com-
petitor who is forced to reduce his price to a new all-time low in
a market of declining prices will in time feel the financial pinch
and will be a less effective competitive force.20
Implicit in the Supreme Court's decision is that where a na-
tional company sells at lower prices in one market than in another
(and hence is at least theoretically able to finance lower profits in
one market from higher profits in other markets), and where the
prices of small, local competitors are forced down substantially over
a significant period of time, then despite the continuing profitabil-
ity and substantial market position of the small local company, the
Commission, a court or a jury may properly conclude that competi-
tion has -been injured or may be injured at the seller's level.
D. Functional Discounts
There is probably no concept that is more difficult for the
25 Dean Milk Co., TRADE REG. REP. [1965:67 Transfer Binder] 17,357 at
22,530-31 (1965).
26 Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 699-700 (1967).
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ordinary businessman to understand than the FTC's doctrine of
functional discounts in price discrimination cases. A functional dis-
count is a lower price extended by a seller to a buyer because of
certain functions performed by that buyer and not by others. For
example, one buyer may stock merchandise, and another may not;
or one buyer may provide designers and architects to work with
specification-writing bodies, and another may not. The most com-
mon case is that of a wholesaler and a retailer, where there is usually
no price discrimination problem because the two classes of trade do
not compete. But a problem does arise where an integrated whole-
saler-retailer competes with a company selling only at retail.
The FTC's doctrine on functional discounts may be sum-
marized as follows: a seller must charge the same prices to buyers
who compete with each other in the resale of merchandise unless
the seller can cost justify any difference in price on the basis of his
own cost savings, or unless the additional functions performed by
the buyer paying lower prices are amenable to treatment under sec-
tions 2 (d) and (e) and are so treated.27 The seller may not compen-
sate the buyer for performing additional functions without comply-
ing with sections 2 (d) and (e).
The practical problems stemming from this doctrine are dif-
ficult if not impossible to resolve. Some functions performed by
buyers simply do not reflect themselves in cost savings to the seller,
particularly cost savings allowable under section 2 (a), and some
services are simply not amenable to treatment under sections 2 (d)
and (e).
Yet it is the fact that buyers often do perform functions in re-
selling the seller's merchandise that are costly to the buyer, and these
costs-legitimate costs of distribution-put pressure on the full-
function buyer to raise his prices. But by raising his prices, the full-
function buyer may not be able to compete in price with the limited-
function buyer who is paying the same price for the merchandise.
The effect of the FTC's doctrine-not permitting a price reduction-
has led to the seller cutting off the limited-function buyer (at his
peril under the antitrust laws), or to the full-function buyer cutting
off the seller, or to the abandonment of legitimate and necessary
functions by the full-function buyer on the ground that he is unable
to perform these functions and remain competitive, or to violation
of the law.
27 See General Foods Corp., 52 F.T.C. 798, 818 (1956); Mucller Co., 60 F.T.C.
120, 125 (1962), af'd, Mueller Co. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 44 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 923 (1964).
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One noteworthy aspect of the functional discount issue is the
split it has caused between the FTC and the Justice Department, as
reflected in briefs filed in the Supreme Court in the Purolator Prod-
ucts case.28 That case involved a charge of a section 2 (a) violation
by a seller of automobile replacement filters. The Commission found
a violation, 9 and the Seventh Circuit affirmed.30 Both the Commis-
sion and the Seventh Circuit rejected Purolator's defense that cer-
tain of its lower prices were charged to certain integrated warehouse
distributor-jobber customers to compensate them for performing
functions that were not performed by jobbers, who paid the higher
price.
Purolator filed a petition for certiorari; the Solicitor General
filed a Memorandum as Amicus Curiae, which was signed by the
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice, urging the Supreme Court to take juris-
diction and asserting its disagreement with the Commission's func-
tional discount doctrine.
In its memorandum, the Justice Department stated:
Not only does the Commission's holding here thus seem un-
supportable in theory, but we believe that it would have unfor-
tunate economic consequences. Specifically, the Commission's ap-
proach would largely impede the achievement of economies
through vertical integration of the steps of the distribution
process, where competitive and economc factors might other-
wise lead to such integration. In many industries supplies will be
distributed more eff idently and economically by an integrated
warehouse and jobber than by two separate independent en-
tites ....
To require a supplier such as Purolator to charge an inte-
grated warehouse-distributor-jobber-or an integrated coopera-
tive-the same price as it charged to an independent jobber who
performs no warehousing function would make such integration
-and the resulting competition-impossible, for it would give
the integrated entity no credit for performing two functions
and it would force it to compete with jobbers who pay the same
price but perform substantially fewer tasks in the distribution
process.
In sum, the United States believes that the Robinson-Pat-
man Act was intended to assure only that "businessmen at the
same functional level would start on equal competitive footing
so far as price is concerned." The Act plainly did not inteni
28 F.T.C. Docket 7850, cert. denied, - US. - (1968).
29 Purolater Products, Inc., TaDE REGn. REP'. [1963-1965 Transfer Binder]
16,877 (1964).
30 Purolator Products, Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
-US. - (1968).
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to require uniformity of price among purchasers operating at
different functional levels, particularly where such uniformity
may, as we suggest, significantly impede economies by protecting
existing-and possibly antiquated-distribution systems from the
normal pressures of competition and distributional innovation.$1
Although the Supreme Court denied certiorari, the dispute be-
tween enforcement agencies over the proper treatment of functional
discounts indicates there may be hope for justifying lower prices on
a functional basis.
II. MEETING COMPETITION
Section 2 (b) of the Robinson-Patman Act provides:
[Njothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting
the prima-facie case thus made by showing that his lower price
or the furnishing of services or facilities to any purchaser ...
was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a com.
petitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a competitor.8 2
A seller who complies with the requirements of section 2 (b)
has a complete defense, regardless of the fact that the lower price
may still cause the requisite injury to competition.8 A great deal
of lore has grown up around the "meeting competition" defense.
Probably the most significant aspect of the defense is the require.
ment of good faith, as indicated in the following quotations from
leading decisions on the defense:
[T]he statute ...requires the seller ... to show the exist-
ence of facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent person
to believe that the granting of a lower price would in fact meet
the equally low price of a competitor.3 4
The standard of good faith is simply the standard of the
prudent businessman responding fairly to what he reasonably
believes is a situation of competitive necessity. 86
An element of common sense is very helpful in deciding in ad-
vance whether a particular price reduction may or may not fall
under the defense. For example, a small seller who has lost business
and has cut his price to retain an old customer is much more likely
to establish the defense than a large seller who has cut his price to
gain a new customer.
31 Memorandum for the United States as Amius Curiae 20-23, Purolator Prod-
ucts, Inc. v. FTC, 352 F.2d 874 (7th Cir. 1965).
32 15 U.S.C. § 13 (b) (1964).
33 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).
34 FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759-60 (1945).
35 Continental Baking Co., TPaAD. REG. REP. [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] 16,720
at 21,649 (1964).
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When a seller inquires of his lawyer whether he may use the
meeting competition defense in a specific situation, two preliminary
steps are suggested. First, it should be determined whether the
seller's prices are presently lawful in the absence of the meeting
competition defense. It often happens that a seller will ask whether
a meeting competition defense applies, but upon inquiry it is de-
termined that his existing prices are unlawful. Second, if it is de-
termined that seller's existing prices are lawful, inquiry should then
be directed to whether the lower price being granted will violate
the Robinson-Patman Act in the absence of the meeting competi-
tion defense, since the lower prices may not violate the Act in any
event. For example, where the sale is for use and not for resale, and
there is no possibility of injury to competition at either the seller's
or the buyer's level, there is no violation.
Assuming that the seller's prices are lawful and that a lower
price extended to a particular customer will violate the Act unless
the meeting competition defense can be established, it is necessary
to consider the conditions that have been attached to the defense
by administrative and judicial decision. The FTC has tended to
limit the defense; it has changed its position at times and appeals
from its rulings have met with varying results in different circuits.
Accordingly, there are difficulties in determining with precision
the status of particular elements of the defense at any particular
time and place.
With the foregoing in mind, the more important elements of
the meeting competition defense can be reviewed:
(1) The FTC has ruled that the lower price must be granted
in an individual competitive situation, not in response to a general
pricing system.36 While this standard was relaxed somewhat in the
Callaway Mills case,37 in which a seller was permitted to adopt a
quantity discount schedule designed to meet a comparable schedule
of a competitor, it is advisable to grant the lower price only in an
individual competitive situation.
(2) In addition, a seller should grant the lower price only
when he knows in advance that a competitor is offering a lower
price to a given customer, as attempts to justify lower prices ex-
tended without such prior knowledge have not always met with suc-
cess. Although the FTC's decision that the seller must establish that
he had knowledge of the competitor's identity and price was re-
36 See, e.g., C. E. Niehoff, & Co., 51 F.T.C. 1114, 1146 (1955), aff'd, 241 F.2d 37,
41 (7th Cir. 1957), vacated on other grounds, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
37 Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966).
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versed- on appeal,8s the safest dourse is to obtain as much informa.
tion as possible short of calling competitors to obtain price informa-
tion from them, and to keep a record of such information.
(3) The Supreme Court has stated that the lower price may
meeti but not beat, the competitor's price.89 The FTC has taken the
position that the offering of premium goods at the same price as a
competitor's non-premium goods is beating, not meeting, competi-
tion.40
(4) While the FTC had taken the position that the defense
may be used to keep existing customers but not to obtain new ones,'"
its decision on this issue was reversed on appeal.42 It does not appear
that the FTC has abandoned its position, however. 48
(5) It has been held that a seller may not use the defense'to
meet another seller's lower price that is itself unlawful because it is
discriminatory.44 While expression of this rule has varied, it seems
to come down to this: a seller may not use the meeting competition
defense if the facts reasonably available to him indicate that the
price he is meeting is unlawful because it is discriminatory. 46
(6) The Supreme Court has held that a seller may lawfully
grant a lower price to meet his own competition, but that he may
not lower his price to permit his customer to meet the latter's com-
petition unless his customer is trying to meet the competition of an
integrated company, or unless the customer's competitor has received
assistance from his supplier.40
(7) While the FTC has held that the seller must establish that
the goods of the competitor whose price he is meeting are the same
as his own,47 this decision was reversed on appeal.48 The court of
appeals held that the comparison between products is not the like
38 Forster Mfg. Co. Inc., TRADE REP. REP. [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] 16,243
(1963), vacated, 335 F.2d 47, 55-56 (Ist Cir. 1964).
39 Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951),
40 Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 44 F.T.C. 351 (1948), rev'd on other
grounds, 191 F.2d 786 (7st Cir. 1951), cert. dismissed, 344 U.S. 206 (1952). See Porto
Rican American Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 30 F.2d 254, 237 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 279 US. 858 (1929).
41 Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 59 F.T.C. 674 (1961).
42 Sunshine Biscuits, Inc. v. FTC, 306 F2d 48 (7th Cir. 1962).
43 FTC Release, Nov. 23, 1962, TRADE REG. REP. 3,345.52 (1965).
44 Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1956).
45 See Knoll Associates, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder)
17,668 at 22,958 (1966).
46 FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 US. 505 (1963).
47 Callaway Mills Co., TRADE REG. REP. [1963-1965 Transfer Binder) 16,800
(1964).
48 Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966).
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grade and quality test of section 2 (a), but is a practical market test
of saleability.
III. PROMOTIONAL ALLOWANCES
Sections 2 (d) and (e) deal with different aspects of the same
problem. Essentially they provide that if a seller extends promo-
tional assistance to one customer, such assistance must be available
on proportionately equal terms to other customers who compete
with the favored buyer in distributing the seller's product. A great
body of law has developed on sections 2 (d) and (e), and the balance
of this article will cover four particular problems.
A. Types of Services and Facilities Covered
A summary of what services and facilities the FTC has said are
covered is: any kind of advertising, handbills, catalogs, window and
floor displays, storage cabinets, warehouse facilities, "push money",
demonstrators, collecting of orders from individual stores, furnish-
ing complete distribution of seller's line, display materials, special
packaging or package sizes, acceptance returns for credit, prizes or
merchandise for conducting promotional contests. 40
B. Identifying the Favored Buyer's Competitors
Once a seller extends promotional assistance to a buyer, the
next step is identification of that buyer's competitors, both geograph-
ically and functionally. Geographically, the test is a practical mar-
ket one. A retail shoe store in downtown Dayton competes with
other downtown retail shoe stores. It probably competes with sub-
urban retail shoe stores but not with Columbus retail shoe stores.
Identification of competitors geographically becomes acute where
the product involved is sold by dealers who cover a substantial
territory, perhaps as much as two or three states. In these instances,
any one dealer will probably compete with two or three other deal-
ers, and the grant of promotional assistance to any one dealer will
probably result, because of dealer overlap, in creating obligations
to every dealer in the country.
Determination of geographic competition between purchasers
at the same functional level is often a difficult question. The prob-
lems are even more difficult where different functional levels are
involved. This issue is raised in the Fred Meyer case,50 which in.
49 Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Pa)ments and
Services (1960), 16 C.F.R. 240, TRADE REG. REP. 1 3,980 (1967).
50 Fred Meyer, Inc., TRADE REG. REP. [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] t 16,368 (1953)0
modified and affirmed, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 386 US. 907 (1967)
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volved an FTC charge that Meyer violated section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act by knowingly inducing allowances that were
not made available to a wholesaler who resold to retailers competing
with Meyer. The Commission found a violation of section 5, but the
Ninth Circuit affirmed only after a modification to limit the scope of
the cease and desist order, on the ground that the two purchasers
(Meyer and the wholesaler) were at different functional levels. The
case was recently argued in the Supreme Court, and decision is
expected shortly.*
C. The Requirements of Making Promotional Assistance "Available"
Determination that a seller has extended promotional assistance
to a buyer and not to his competitors triggers the seller's obligation
to make such assistance "available" to such competitors on propor-
tionately equal terms. Making such assistance "available" means let-
ting competing buyers know that promotional assistance that they
can use is available, and being able to prove it. For example, it has
been stated that:
A seller who has paid a special promotional allowance to
some customers and not to others does not avoid the proscrip.
tion of §2 (d) merely because payment might have been 'avail-
able . . .'; he avoids it only if such payment 'is' available.5 1
[Payment] . . . 'is' available to a customer, whether on
proportionately equal' terms or otherwise, only if the customer
knows about it .... the crucial factor is not the particular for-
malities by which [the customer] acquired [knowledge], but the
information actually possessed by the customer-particularly his
knowledge of the seller's willingness to grant him the allow.
ance.
52
D. The Requirement of "Proportionately Equal"
The FTC's view of "proportionately equal" is
Payments or services must be proportionalized on some
basis that is fair to all customers who compete. No single way to
proportionalize is prescribed by law. Any method that treats
competing customers on proportionally equal terms may be used.
Generally, this can best be done by basing the payments made
or the services furnished on the dollar volume or on the quan.
tity of goods purchased during a specified time.
Example: A seller may properly offer to pay a specified part(say 50%) of the cost of local newspaper advertising up to an
amount equal to a set percentage (such as 5%) of the dollar
51 Vanity Fair Paper Mills, Inc. v. FTC, 311 F2d 480, 487 (2d Cir. 1962).
52 House of Lord's, Inc., TRAE REG. REP. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] 17,437
(1966).
*Su. Ct. held that supplier must see that all retailers get the allowances,
including those buying through wholesalers. 88 Su. Ct. 907 (1968).-En
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volume of purchases during a specified time.
Example: A seller may properly place in reserve a specified
amount of money for each unit purchased, and use it to re-
imburse customers for newspaper advertising when they prove
they have advertised. 53
The Attorney General's National Committee suggested three
ways in which this requirement can be met:
(1) payment of a dollar allowance per unit of promo-
tional service rendered by each buyer, up to a uniform maxi-
mum percentage of his dollar volume; (2) a simplified plan,
granting each buyer a set dollar allowance per unit of merchan-
dise bought, on condition that he perform a specified minimum
quantum of promotional services; (3) the seller's direct furnish-
ing of promotional services to the buyer, worth a uniform per-
centage of each buyer's volume.54
IV. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the Robinson-Patman Act constitutes a large
portion of the modern antitrust picture. Recent cases have extended
the scope of the prima facie case considerably; and the defenses are
relatively narrow and difficult to prove. Therefore, the practicing
attorney should attempt to see that pricing and promotional deci-
sions of his client are carefully scrutinized in light of the Act before
being implemented.
53 Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and
Services (1960), 16 C.F.R. 240, TRADE Rnz. REP. 3,980 (1967).
54 REPORT OF ThE ATroRNEY GENERAi's NATtoNAL COMMrrrEE To SruDY TuE
AMTnRusr LAws 189 (1955).
